American people, consumer expectations have risen dramatically in the last 20 years. In addition to any legal changes the movement has wrought, significant changes in corporate policy and structure have been effected which expedite the corporations* responsiveness to consumers. Examples include consumer "hot lines," s~stematic complaint-handling mechanisms, expanded warranty coverage and increased pointof-sale product information. See D. RICE, CONSUMER have responded with stringent sentencing recommendations for corporate offenders who s For example, bills which would establish an "Agency for Consumer Advocacy" have been introduced in Congress for several years. Although such a proposal was only narrowly defeated in the 94th Congress, the following "consumer agency" bills have been introduced in the 95th Congress (1st Sess.): H.
7014, H. 7185, H. 6118 and H. 6437. In the 94th
Congress version, the agency was to have no direct enforcement authority, but was to act as a centralized consumer advocate and fact-finding body on the federal level. 6 In United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Park], the Court sustained the principle first set down in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) , which held that no criminal intent need be shown to establish a violation of the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § § 301-92 (1970) . In Park, the Court held the president and chief executive officer of a large national food chain criminally liable for unsanitary storage conditions in one of the company's warehouses by virtue of the power and responsibility of his position. The Court found unconvincing Park's arguments that normal operating duties, including sanitation, had in fact been delegated to a division vice president. Chief Justice Burger justified the imposition of strict criminal liability, which presently does not exist outside of the food and drug area, by noting that the Food and Drug Act's purpose is the protection of the public welfare, that Park had assumed his duties voluntarily, and that Park had in fact had the power to prevent and correct the violation. 421 U.S. at 672.
7 Among the factors which could determine if the Park notion of strict criminal liability will be applied to other areas of the law are: (1) the nature of the public interest to be protected, (2) the nature of the penalties already authorized for the offense, (3) the purposes of such penalties, and (4) the legislative history of the relevant statute. For an analysis of the applicability of the Park principles to other federal or state regulatory statutes, see 13 AM. CR1M. L.
ple, the Park case, coupled with the FDA's increased efforts to notify heads of companies of alleged criminal violations have "succeeded spectacularly at 'executive consciousness-raising'." Business Week, May 10, 1976 , at 111. demonstrated, this failure is due in large part to a marked lack of appropriate penalties in the federal laws which regulate American business. The burden is on Congress to devise new sanctions if regulatory legislation is to be effective." This Comment discusses three major issues which policy-makers must reckon within the process of selecting appropriate sanctions. First, there are the inherent moral questions: Is the corporate crime immoral? Should morality make a difference as to whether a criminal law ought to be used as a vehicle for social control? Second, if corporate crime is an appropriate vehicle, the purposes of criminal penalties must be delineated. Are we seeking only deterrence or should we also consider retribution, education and rehabilitation in devising sanctions? Finally, policy-makers must make as careful a matching. as possible between the purposes identified and the proposals for new and reformed criminal sanctions directed at corporate criminals.
THE PROBLEM OF MORAL NEUTRALITY
A basic theoretical problem regarding the use of criminal sanctions for corporate illegality is that there is no clear correlation between what is commercially acceptable vs. legally acceptable behavior. Activities such as price-fixing and bribery of foreign officials, for example, are well-entrenched in the conventional businessman's "moral code.' 2 Thus, as Her-" There is no serious question today that the federal government has broad powers to proscribe the iriminal acts of corporations and their agents. "The determinative test of exercise of power by Congress is simply whether the activity sought to be regulated is 'commerce which concerns more than one state' and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest." Heart of Atlanta Hotel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964) .
12 A poll of the presidents of Fortune's top 1000 industrial firms showed that 60% of those responding agreed that "many [businessmen] price-fix." In a similar study it was found that nearly one half of U.S. business leaders see nothing wrong with bribing foreign officials in order to attract or retain contracts.
White Collar Justice, supra note 2, at 3.
In 1961 Harvard Business Review survey, fourfifths of its subscribers agreed that within their own industries there were accepted business practices which the respondents regarded as unethical. M. 283 (1971) (Preliminary Draft for the Nader Study Group Report on Antitrust Enforcement) [hereinafter cited as
GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM
bert Packer noted, 13 such behavior fails "to excite the necessary sense of indignation and outrage that it takes for criminal sanctions to be unsparingly applied."" Viewed only from the somewhat narrow perspective of corporate executives, it is not difficult to perceive why businessmen refuse to see themselves as'criminals even when convicted, 15 and why they resist the use of criminal sanctions for corporate wrongdoing in general.
For the most part, the judiciary appears to share the view that there is nothing morally reprehensible about corporate crime, and that is a situation which obviously impedes successful prosecution of corporate offenders. Packer did not reject the use of the criminal sanction in the "common regulatory sphere," he did believe that the sanction would have to be expanded in scope if a better match between punishment and crime is to be realized. Id. at 362.
S A former General Electric vice president who was convicted of price-fixing and sent to prison for his part in the massive electrical equipment pricefixing conspiracy of the early 1960's wrote the following before serving his jail term: "All of you know that next Monday, in Philadelphia, I will start serving a thirty day jail term, along with six other businessmen for conduct which has been interpreted as being in conflict with the complex antitrust laws." Geis, While it does not appear that the media have substantially altered their coverage of corporate crime, 2 ' an argument can be made that public resentment is nonetheless coalescing to a point where the public would readily accept greater use of criminal sanctions for corporate wrongdoing. First, the development of the consumer movement has only been possible because of higher levels of education and sophistication in the population. Consumers understand the nature of corporate crime, particularly when they '" See White Collar Justice, supra note 2, at 6-7, 10-11. One study was conducted by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, where many white collar criminals are prosecuted. It found that white collar offenders receive more lenient treatment "as a general rule." Id. at 7.
15 E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 49-52 (1949) perceive the economic and physical injury which may flow to them as a result. 22 Second, when the public becomes aware of white collar crime the use of criminal sanctions is clearly favored. Surveys indicate that people feel the wearing of a white collar is a privilege which should carry with it a sort of public trust which, when violated, requires severe criminal punishment. 23 There appears, then, to be a genuine lack of consensus regarding the immorality of corporate crime. Businessmen and a large segment of the judiciary do not equate corporate wrongdoing with anti-social conduct, while it appears that much of the general public disagrees. The question is thus raised whether the criminal law is an appropriate vehicle for social change-here, of corporate malfeasancewhen such a moral consensus does not exist. One view is to reject the use of the criminal law because, it is argued, we cannot persuade people to see conduct as wrongful simply by making it criminal. 24 In addition, many contend that overuse of the criminal sanction when little moral culpability is associated with the offense tends to dull 'any moral stigma which might attach to the penalty and causes the public to resent efforts to enforce the law. 25 22 For example, when the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department first established an "antitrust hotline" in Pittsburgh to encourage citizens to report possible violations of the antitrust laws, speculation was that many calls would be received from shoppers complaining of price-fixing at the retail level. Wall St.J., Apr. 7, 1977 (Business Bulletin), at 1, col. 5.
2 The Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower found, for instance, a strong public disposition to sentence accountants who embezzle more harshly than either young burglars or persons caught looting during a riot. hand, acceptance of strict criminal liability for public welfare offenses shows that the law will label some conduct as criminal which is not immoral . 30 In short, it appears that when legislatures provide for criminal sanctions for certain acts, they often do so not because the immediate conduct is either rightful or wrongful in itself, but because they believe that some social advantage will result. 11 Robert E. Lane's study of compliance with governmental regulations in general demonstrated that "there was no tendency to react against a wide range of laws, no evident general antiregulation animus," and that it was "the position of the firm, rather than the emotional qualities of its management, which led it to violate." R. Philosophers have at times placed both general and specific deterrence into a utilitarian model of criminal sanctions. Punishment, which is regarded by utilitarians as a prima facie evil, is thus justifiable only insofar as it prevents an even greater evil from occurring,-such as physical or economic harm. Note, An important function of the corrections system is the deterrence of crime. The premise that by confining criminal offenders in a facility where they are isolated from the rest of society, a condition that most people presumably find undesirable, they and others will be deterred from committing additional criminal offenses. For the views of many judges who likewise accept the value of punishment for its general deterrence 41 For example, the legislative history of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), shows that the purpose of the increase in the criminal sanctions there for antitrust violations was to better deter illegal conduct which prevents effective competition. Antitrust Hearings, supra note 8, at 4. 42 See generally, ZIMRING, supra note 37, at 91-194.
The authors derived their variables from findings in experimental psychology.
ferences among persons; (2) types of threatened behavior; (3) communication of the threat; (4) types of threatened consequences; (5) variations in the severity of the consequences; and (6) the credibility of the threat. Application of these variables to the corporate context tends to support general deterrence as a sound basis for criminal sanctions for corporate illegality. First, in terms of differences among people the following characteristics hale been identified as making a person especially responsive to legal threats: future orientation, risk avoidance, a high level of socialization, respect for authority and high socio-economic status.
43 Obviously, these traits are characteristic of most persons who occupy the corporate suites. Theoretically, then, persons who hold positions of leadership in corporations would seem to be a particularly threat-sensitive audience.
Second, the type of behavior threatened by the criminal sanction will influence the effectiveness of that sanction. In particular, the "emotional context" of the crime is thought to be significant in this regard. Thus, deliberate corporate crimes, such as price-fixing and product safety violations, where willfullness must be shown to secure a criminal conviction, should be most responsive to legal threats. This is due to the fact that the criminal is not acting on impulse and has time to ponder the legal consequences of his actions. 44 Third, even if businessmen do not always heed the threat of criminal punishment, it does appear that the threat is often communicated to them. 46 Businessmen almost uniformly opposed the procreased use of the jail sanction for white collar offenders has stirred some serious concern as Well.
The fourth variable affecting responsiveness to legal threats is the type of consequences which can flow from a criminal conviction. Businessmen will clearly not respond to a threat if the consequences of ignoring that threat do not truly alter their lifestyle. However, if the corporate executive realizes that actual economic deprivation, a loss of privileges, or particularly, stigmitization could result, he might be more responsive.
Next, variations in the severity of the consequences are thought to have some influence on the response to threats. There is, however, much disagreement as to exactly how this factor operates. Using a strictly economic analysis, general deterrence would be achieved by a punishment set at such a level that the cost of criminal activity is greater than the value of that activity to the perpetrator. 47 280 (1961) . the author advances the following hypothesis for corporate crime which is economically motivated, such as price-fixing or bribery of foreign officials:
The rate of acquisitive corporate crime engaged in on behalf of any [widely-held] corporation will a) vary directly with the expectation of net gain to that corporation from the crime, and will b) var) inversely with the certainty and severity of the impact with which the criminal sanction personally falls upon these who formulate corporate policy. Id. at 282. this analysis would seem to have less value. 4 9 Up to this point, the discussion of the variables related to general deterrence might seent to indicate that criminal sanctions have considerable potential to deter corporate wrongdoing. Why,°then, is corporate crime increasing? The answer appears to lie at least in part in the final variable, the credibility of the sanction itself. For a criminal sanction to be credible, a two-step process must take place. First, the would-be criminal must believe that there is a reasonable probability of being caught. Unfortunately, this probability is considerably less than one considering the ability to conceal and the increasing complexity of much white collar crime," 0 as well as the inadequate law enforcement resources devoted to the problem of corporate crime." Second, the potential criminal must believe that if he is apprehended there is a high probability of being seriously punished. This probability is likewise very low for corporate crime because, as will be shown, either the punishment itself is not serious or, even if it is substantial, there is little likelihood of its imposition.
Under the theory of specific deterrence the goal of criminal punishment is to deter the criminal himself, rather than others, from committing further crimes. This is accomplished by giving him an unpleasant experience that he will not wish to endure again. ' H Despite the emphasis given to general and specific deterrence -as the primary theories of punishment, a very discernible thread of the oldest theory, retribution, also underlies the use of the criminal sanction for white collar offenders. Under this theory, punishment is imposed by society on the criminal in an effort to vindicate its wrath.
3 5 Thus, findings that the public favors harsher penalties for white collar offenders who breach a public trust might be an indication that the public wants retribution. In two recent cases where corporate executives were sentenced to prison for violation of federal laws, the sentencingjudges explicitly stated that a notion of "just deserts" was at the root of the imposition of prison sentences. 56 From a legislative perspective, recent efforts to reform the sentencing process in federal courts have identified retribution as the principal justification for imprisonment, with rehabilitation only a beneficial by-product. idea of "squaring accounts" might be, however, it should not become the sole justification for the use of criminal sanctions directed at corporate crime. The desire for retribution is, after all, basically an emotion, and to have to quantify and apply so yolatile a factor in a criminal sanction would be difficult indeed.
Under the education theory of criminal punishment, the publicity which accompanies the imposition of a criminal sanction serves to inculcate a sense of morality-or at least awareness-in the public that might otherwise be lacking.
58 At the present time, this purpose for'
criminal sanctions can only be realized as a' positive by-product which occurs when the mass media publicizes an indictment, trial or sentencing proceeding. Although one can argue that there is increasing awareness of'corporate crime among the public, it is doubtful that this can be attributed to publicity surrounding the use of criminal sanctions for corporate wrongdoing, considering the media's general de-emphasis of such crime. 9 Still, this potential for added awareness which could flow from the use of criminal sanctions ought to be considered in the process of shaping new criminal sanctions.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

Sanctions Directed Against the Corporation
Under present federal case law corporations can be held criminally liable for statutory violations regardless of whether the statute specifically mentions corporations as subject to its sanctions. 60 The purpose of a sanction directed at a corporation-be it criminal prosecution, private civil actions, injunctions or other civil penalties-is to control the corporation through 58 LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 31, at 23. 1s See note 21 supra and accompanying text. 60. Many federal regulatory statutes hold only "persons" subject to their criminal sanctions. However, I U.S.C. § 1 defines "person" as including "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, joint stock companies, as well as individuals," unless the context of the statute dictates otherwise. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
In civil law countries, the idea of societas delinquere non potest-"the corporation can do no wrong"-is still recognized. Thus, anyone who acts for a corporation knows that he or she cannot escape criminal liability by shifting the blame to the corporate entity. threats to its profits. Presumably, then, whether a particular sanction has any deterrent value will depend on whether the costs of the criminal sanction to the corporation outweigh the benefits of continuing the illegality."
As presently administered, corporate fines lack credibility as profit-diminishing sanctions. This is due largely to the exceedingly low maximum penalties found in most statutes, relative to both the assets of the offender 62 and the extent of the damage caused by the misconduct. Moreover, these maximum amounts are rarely imposed by judges and juries. This failure to penalize corporate offenders to the maximum extent possible could be due in part to the use of the nolo contendere plea. Although legally a plea of no contest can subject the defendant to the same fine as if he had pleaded guilty, 6 5 in fact, judges sentence far more leniently after a nolo plea than after a conviction which follows a plea of either guilty or not guilty."
Not only is the criminal fine incapable of 61 See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
62
For example, the effect of the $437,500 fine levied on General Electric for its part in the electrical equipment price-fixing conspiracy was roughly equivalent to a $3.00 parking fine for a man with an income of $15,000 per year. CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 324.
" Although the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act did raise the maximum corporate fine to one million dollars for violations of the Sherman Act, even this amount appears insignificant when one realizes that some seven billion dollars of commerce was affected by the electrical equipment price-fixing conspiracy. Id. at 323.
For Food and Drug Act violations this contrast becomes even more pronounced if one considers the economic and physical damage which can result in relation to the maximum $1,000 fine. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (1970) . See note 3 supra. 6 In the Alton case, for instance, 13 of the 22 corporate defendants received fines less than even the previous $50, 000 significantly diminishing a corporation's profits directly, but it also fails to do so indirectly by damage to the company's goodwill. It is likely that the media's unwillingness to report fully the use of criminal sanctions for corporate crime which is at fault here. 6 7 Theoretically, if consumers were made aware of corporate illegality when a criminal sanction was imposed they might be more inclined to take their business to more responsible companies. In this manner, criminal sanctions could supplement the efforts of the consumer movement in fighting corporate criminality. At the present time, however, any cost/benefit analysis for most major corporations would reveal that the corporate fine amounts to little more than a reasonable license fee-just another cost of doing business imposed by the government. 
Sanctions Directed Against the Individual
In light of the inadequacies of the present system of criminal sanctions for the corporations, prosecutions of individuals might seem to be the answer to more effective enforcement of corporate criminal laws. In particular, the stigmitization that follows an individual prosecution is thought to be an excellent general and specific deterrent for white collar offenders. 69 However, despite the potential value and relative ease of proceeding criminally against a "person" under most statutes, criminal sanctions directed at the corporation's policy-makers have proved to be largely ineffectual.
Practically speaking, the major obstacle to 67 See note 23 supra.
71 YALE LJ. at 287. Christopher Stone argues that in general legal threats constitute only a small range of the threats that a corporation faces in dealing with the outside world. Moreover, he notes that having profits cut by a law suit does not involve the same "loss of face" as losses attributable to other causes, such as a poor marketing decision. C Note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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individual prosecutions is that the corporate entity tends to conceal the real actors in a given situation. In many cases, this has raised problems of identifying which persons in the corporate structure are actually responsible for the wrongful act. 70 A somewhat more perplexing problem is the not infrequent phenomenon of a jury convicting a corporate defendant, yet acquitting an individuil for the same offense at the same trial. The reason for this appears to be that jurors tend to separate conduct which they condemn from the individual with whom they often sympathize. 7 1 Finally, judicial hostility to criminal prosecutions of white collar offenders, and their acceptance of the nolo contendere plea, are significant bars to effective individual prosecutions.
The fine is the most common criminal sanction imposed upon the individual convicted of corporate crime. However, even apart from the general problems of establishing complicity within the corporate structure and the attitudes of judges and jurors, individual fines will remain an ineffective deterrent as long as defendants can be indemnified. Not only are the bylaws of most major corporations extremely liberal in their basic indemnification provisions, 7 2 but more than seventeen states today permit 70 In the electrical equipment cases, for example, "the high policy makers of General Electric and other companies involved escaped personal accountability for a criminal conspiracy . . . despite the belief of the trial judge and most observers that these higher officials either knew of and condoned these activities [price-fixing] or were willfully ignorant of them." Kadish, supra note 37, at 431.
In Alton Box Board, however, the Government apparently had little difficulty pinpointing who within each of the 23 manufacturers was responsible for that company's participation in the bid-rigging conspiracy. Those 74 would permit such insurance to cover any wrongful act, regardless of whether the corporation would have the power to indemnify the individual "directly" under the statute. 5 Admittedly, corporations might not be able to attract qualified leadership if there were not indemnification insurance. In addition, there is nothing to stop the corporation from making a larger compensation arrangement with the executive and letting him pay for this insurance himself. Despite the validity of these arguments, they should not outweigh the fact that overbroad indemnification statutes, such as that in Delaware, not only reduce the deterrent effect of the criminal fine on the individual, but in the process create the possibility that a corporation can insure its executives against their own intentional wrongdoing.
The other sanction available in nearly every ' Section 145(a) of the Delaware statute permits a corporation to indemnify an officer or director against expenses and fines in a criminal action only if he acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in the best interest of the corporation, and if he had no reasonable cause to believe his action was unlawful.
However statute that provides criminal penalties for individuals convicted of corporate crime is imprisonment. However, this sanction is almost never imposed, largely because judges and juries are particularly loathe to sentence an individual corporate offender to prison. 7 6 As a result, for example, a higher percentage of persons convicted of violating the migratory bird laws are sentenced to prison for longer terms, than those who violate the antitrust laws. 7 7 Moreover, even when corporate officials go to jail, prosecutors complain that they are sent to the relatively "luxurious" prison facilities. 78 Ironically, all of this occurs at a time when the available evidence shows that the threat of a prison term, even at a facility designed for low-risk white collar criminals, could well be the single most effective deterrent for corporate crime. Theoretically, the unpleasantness which accompanies a stay in prison is anathema to a corporate executive. Apart from the very significant stigma of a criminal conviction, 79 the offender faces a marked invasion of his privacy as well as a deprivation of his opportunity to make a living. In addition, a felony conviction can mean a loss of privileges such as the right to vote, the right to hold public office and the right to practice certain occupations or professions.
8 0 In sum, for the corporate offender, presumably highly responsive to others' 76 " [E] ven when the evidence is strong [against an individual white collar defendant], a form of jury nullification can occur, where the jurors realize that a well-dressed, white, wealthy, articulate father of three, might actually go to jail with unkempt, nonwhite poor, uneducated street criminals." CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 317. opinions about him, the threat of such demeaning social sanctions is especially effective.
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A number of remedies recently have been suggested to improve the present inadequate network of criminal sanctions directed at corporate offenders. In this section the effectiveness and feasibility of several of these proposals will be examined, keeping in mind the potential purposes of the sanctions: general deterrence, specific deterrence, retribution, education, incapacitation and rehabilitation. A basic problem in the criminal enforcement of federal regulatory legislation today is the fact that judges and juries do not impose even the currently available criminal sanctions upon corporate offenders in the same manner as they do regular criminals. While this phenomenon is certainly related to the moral neutrality of corporate crime, it can also be attributed to two additional factors. First, there is no uniformity among the penalties provided in federal statutes regulating business. 81 This lack of uniformity can in turn be explained by the fact that laws have been drafted over time by different Congresses with different views as to the purposes of the criminal sanction and its place in the statute's total enforcement scheme.
Congress could do much to alleviate the problem by providing a reasoned range of penalties in new criminal sanctions. While the range of alternatives should be wide enough to enable the sentencing judge to make the punishment fit the criminal, 2 the range itself should be set within bounds which reflect the legislators' view of the purposes of the sanction as well as the moral reprehensibility of the 81 In a study of the enforcement mechanisms found in 28 federal "public welfare" statutes, no common thread was found to explain the variation in the type and degree of the penalties used in the fine for each should likewise be roughly the same. Presently, however, a violator of the Consumer Product Safety Act is subject to a S50,000 maximum criminal fine, whereas a violator of the Food and Drug Act is subject to a maximum fine of only $1000. The second explanation for the disparity in sentences which operates in favor of white collar offenders is that in general there is no list of criteria set down that a sentencing judge can use to decide which penalty to impose and to what degree. Useful criteria for corporate criminals would include the purposes of the criminal sanction for the particular crime or class of corporate offenses, as well as factors related to the defendant himself, such as level of responsibility, size of the corporation 86 and remorse and rehabilitation. There are a number of ways a set of criteria might be developed. Congress could establish an independent administrative agency which would establish specific, fixed sentence ranges for similar defendants who commit similar crimes. Alternatively, sentencing "institutes" for judges could be held to perform this function.
8 A third possibility is that each regulatory agency would promulgate specific sentencing guidelines for violations of the laws they enforce. 8 ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 82, at 349. The ABA also recommends that sentencing councils be established at which different judges of the same court could discuss the most desirable sentences for particular defendants prior to sentencing. Id.
'9 In November. 1976, the Antitrust Division announced such guidelines for price-fixers. See note 8 supra.
Apart from efforts to establish sentencing criteria independent of actual cases, there should also be a requirement that sentencing proceedings be made a matter of public record.9 0 This might promote a more reasoned sentencing opinion by the judge and could ensure a greater degree of consistency among sentencing judges. Similarly, appellate review of sentences 9 ' would promote greater rationality of sentences as well as respect for the system in general.
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Sanctions Directed Against the Coiporation Fines
For corporate fines to serve equity and the purposes of deterrence, they must be calibrated to both the magnitude of the harm caused as well as the size of the corporation. The latter factor could be provided for by replacing absolute maximum fines with fines set at a fixed percentage of a corporation's assets or profits for a given period of time. For example, a fine could be set at ten percent of the company's gross sales receipts for the period covered by the indictment.
93 Such a method avoids the possible unfairness to small corporations which could result if maximum amounts were simply increased.
Taking into account the gradient of the victim's harm in corporate fines is an idea that has received much support from commentators. 94 Moreover, this principle was incorpo9°See ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 82, at 375-76.
9 Appellate review of sentences would be established by H. 7245, 95th Congress (1st Sess.), introduced by Rep. Rodino.
92 ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 82, at 407, 412-13 (1974) . In addition, appellate review could guard against excessive sentences and would better focus the issues on the appellate level in general since many appeals are now taken because the defendant is dissatisfied with his sentence.
93 "In Common Market nations such as West Germany, antitrust and other laws now impose fines on the basis of a percentage of the gross annual sales or profits of the firm, rather than in stated currency amounts.. . ." TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION, supra note 3, at 250.
'4 See, e.g., 71 YALE L.j. at 297-300. The author argues that a civil attachment proceeding should accompany a criminal proceeding against a corporate offender whereby the government could recover from the convicted corporation all profits illegally earned. The government would then be obliged to return to any injured party compensation for any
1978]
rated into the ill-fated S. 1 and S. 1400 of the 93d and 94th Congresses.
5 Adduced as evidence at trial, factors such as personal injury, property damage, or loss caused by the illegal act, or the pecuniary benefit derived, could go into the calculation of the fine. The ultimate figure could serve as the upper boundary for the fine," or, -as Posner suggests, could be divided by the probability of detection and successful prosecution in that type of case to set the exact amount of the fine.
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The principal disadvantages of this type of system are the bookkeeping difficulties, particularly with the Posner method, and the problen of coordination with private civil suits." Moreover, it has been argued that a basic flaw in any sanction directed at the corporate entity is that the real punishment is visited upon shareholders, creditors and eventually the public if the fine is translated into higher prices. Although it may well be unrealistic to think damages which lie can prove resulted proximately fiom the crime. Id. at 297-98.
The 17 l'hus, the damages in a partictlar case will exceed the losses to victims in that case, but if the apprehension rate was estimated correctly, the sum of the damages awarded in all such cases will equal the sum of the losses of al the victims. For example, if there is a .25 probability of apprehension and successful prosecution for a particular corporate crime, and the actual damiges were $100.000, the amount of the fine would be S100,000/.25, or S400,000. Posner feels that the private treble damage remedy available under §4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §4. is a step in the right direction, but is too rigid to be applied in all circumstances. POSNER that shareholders or creditors have any significant direct control over corporate policy in the modern publicly-held corporation, 99 an argument can be made that consumers have such control, albeit indirect. Assuming there is competition in the convicted corporation's industry, prices cannot rise to absorb the fine. If this occurs, profits will go down, debt and equity financing will become difficult, expansion will be curtailed, and investors will look for a more law-abiding corporation.
Formal Publicity
Under this proposal corporations would be required to give some sort of notice of a criminal conviction to the public in general, or at least to those who might be financially interested. The notice could take the form of advertisements in appropriate media, or required clauses in contracts and other corporate documents. Precedents already exist to a limited extent. The Food and Drug Act requires that the FDA give public notice of all criminal prosecutions, 0° and this is reportedly an effective deterrent within the industry. ' In the labor relations field the National Labor Relations Board has at times required employers guilty of "massive" unfair labor practices to post notice of the Board's order, as well as to mail the order to the individual employees."' 2 Such requirements have the effect of impressing upon the employees the seriousness of the employer's offense.
The major drawback of the formal publicity sanction is, however, that it will be very difficult to predict the effect of the sanction. Negative consumer reaction to an advertisement could well punish the corporation beyond the damage actually done. Conversely, the corporation would be free to counter the adverse publicity with a barrage of positive image-oriented advertising.
Corporate Rehabilitation
While rehabilitation has been a popular theory for individual punishment, 3 it has not been applied to the corporate offender. Two proposals have been advanced which would provide "treatment" for the convicted corporation in order to "return" it to society so reformed that it will not commit further crimes. The first, corporate probation, would require the establishment of a public trusteeship whereby the corporation is allowed to continue in business as long as it promises to fulfill certain conditions. Modest precedent for such a procedure comes from a federal court in the Northern District of Illinois where the court stipulated that if an oil company did not correct an oil spillage problem within forty-five days, a special probation officer would be appointed who would have the powers of a trustee under the supervision of the court, and could ensure that steps were being taken to correct the problem.1 0 4 However, for any federal sanction to be effective, where the ultimate threat is the revocation of a state-granted corporate charter, the inherent federalism confict must be reckoned with. A federal charter to replace the current system of state charters for corporations is one solution. 10 5 A less sweeping remedy would be to establish prosecutors who would Pollution Control Act."
1 ' A problem with this latter proposal, however, is that there is no guarantee that, even with the promise of job protection, there are sufficient numbers of employees who would be aware of corporate illegality and, more importantly, would be willing to "rock the boat" by reporting it." 2 
Corporate Quarantine
First articulated in S. 1, this sanction would suspend the right of the corporation to engage in interstate or foreign commerce for a term to which an individual would have been sentenced to prison for the same offense.
' 13 Such a procedure is similar to the Securities Exchange Commission's power to suspend operations or revoke the registration of brokers and dealers." 1 4 The chief advantages of this form of "corporate incapacitation" are that it would overcome the bookkeeping problems of the proposed corporate fine, and it would impress upon shareholders, employees, customers and other businesses the severity of the offense. However, there are several problems with the proposal which make its realization unlikely. First, its deterrent, retributive and educational value could probably be achieved by less draconian measures, such as a fine or limited publicity requirement. Second, employees and the community surrounding a quarantined corporation would suffer for the period of suspension. Third, the proposal fails to protect the contractual and other obligations of the corporation to innocent lenders and customers. Finally, the enforcement problems would be enormous, particularly for a large corporation with dispersed operations.
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter." "' Section 507 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act protects employees from discharge or discrimination resulting from their institution of or participation in any proceedings under the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1976).
12 For several case studies of persons from all levels of the corporate and governmental hierarchies, who were willing to blow the whistle for the sake of the public interest, see WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 107, at 35-179. 
Forced Disolution
Section 6.04 of the Model Penal Code"' authorizes a prosecuting attorney in a criminal action to institute quo uarranto proceedings in a state court of general jurisdiction to forfeit the charter of a corporation organized under the state's laws. The court may order the charter forfeited upon finding that the corporation or its agents have purposefully engaged in a course of criminal conduct, and that the public interest requires protection from further illegality. For criminal violations of federal regulatory laws, some plan integrating state and federal prosecutions would have to be devised."' 6 Moreover, because this sanction is the equivalent of "corporate capital punishment," it would have to be reserved for only the most persistent and egregious instances of corporate criminality. However, the relative infrequency of the use of the sanction itself would probably tend to render its general and specific deterrent value negligible." ' Finally, even if the corporation's charter is revoked, there would be little to stop a corporation from re-incorporating in another state. I"
Liberal Construction of Existing Statutes and Regulations
There are at least three existing federal sanctions which might be deployed against a corporation subsequent to a criminal conviction. None has as yet been used to combat corporate crime, but all could conceivably appear in a government brief arguing in favor of stricter criminal penalties for a corporate defendant.
Conspiracy Against the Rights of Citizen.%, 18
U.S.C. §241, provides that a S10,000 fine and ten years imprigonment may be imposed "[i]f two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of an)' right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution of 11, MODEL PENAL CODE, §6.04(2)(a), supra note 94. 16 See note 106 vupra and accompanying text. If the probability of the sanctions being imposed is extremely'low, it is unlikely that a corporation will even consider the costs of dissolution when weighing the benefits and costs of a course of illegal conduct. fication statutes which seem warranted are greater judicial control of settled and compromised actions and mandatory disclosure of all indemnity payments. The disclosure requirement could serve by itself as an effective deterrent since most executives are probably loathe to having their misdeeds made known. In addition, it could serve educational and retributive goals by indicating to shareholders and creditors the seriousness of the executive's offense.
Once the factor of indemnification is eliminated from criminal fines, the certainty of the fine as well as the appropriateness of the amount must be ensured such that the sanction has credibility and does indeed function as a deterrent. A mandatory minimum amount would accomplish the objective of certainty, as would judicial acceptance of the principle that the nolo contendere plea is truly equivalent to a guilty plea or guilty conviction, and that it should not mean greater leniency. As for the appropriateness of the amount of the fine itself, this is an area where very little is known in terms of deterrence of individuals. 35 Thus, apart from a minimum amount required by law, the actual amount should be left to the discretion of the sentencing judge to decide in the circumstances of each case. One very important circumstance is whether the individual is receiving compensation from his corporation for the fine, even if not in the form of direct indemnification for expenses or indemnification insurance. For example, if it appears that the executive is being given greater compensation in order to pay his own indemnification premiums. either a higher fine or alternative sanction ought to be employed.
Imprisonment
Greater certainty of a sentence of imprisonment following a criminal violation is likely to be the best means of bridging the gap which exists between the deterrent effects of a prison stay (or threat of one) and the infrequency of its use for corporate criminals. Thus, a mandatory sentence of some minimum length could inal ,iolations of the Sherman Act, or recent public welfare laws such as the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2070 § (Supp. 1975 , where intent must be shown. 129 ZIMRING, .upra note 37, at 194-95.
be established in the statute, 3 0 with various mitigating factors which the sentencing judge could rely upon to vary the length of the sentence. For example, the Justice Department suggests four mitigating factors be taken into account in reducing its recommended eighteen month sentence for antitrust violators: cooperation with the government, health, special family circumstances and factors mitigating the defendant's role in the offense.' 3 ' From a purely economic standpoint, however, it can be argued that imprisonment is not an appropriate remedy, at least for corporate executives who have sufficient current assets to cover the amount of the penalty. Under this argument, fines and imprisonment are simply different ways of imposing economic costs on violators.' 32 Considering the high costs to society of imprisonment,' 3 3 a fine exacted from a financially-capable defendant is a much better allocation of resources than imprisonment. In addition, Posner argues that any attempt to translate the costs to society of corporate crime into a non-monetary term of imprisonment, will only result in leniencyY. 132 POSNER, supra note 47, at 364. Thus for the judgment proof defendant, a term of imprisonment is a means of imposing an economic cost in terms of work opportunities lost.
" The costs include: (1) the expense of constructing, maintaining and operating the prison; (2) the loss of the incarcerated individual's legitimate production, and (3) the probable impairment of any legitimate productivity after release from prison. garding the morality of corporate crime, but realistically none is needed. As long as there is ,some sense of moral opprobrium attached to such crime in our society, Congress should continue to employ criminal sanctions to combat it.
The primary purpose to which new criminal sanctions should be directed is general deterrence. Although our knowledge of the actual effects of criminal punishment in general is limited, deterrence seems to be the'theory most easil) quantified in terms of fixing a type of punishment for corporate crime which will produce the desired effect. This is particularly true when the motives and effects of the corporate illegality can be translated into economic terms. Retribution and education are legitimate goals as well, but their very nature dictates that thev can he treated as beneficial by-products of criminal sanctions designed chiefly as deterrents. In addition, rehabilitation and incapacitation ought to be recognized as goals for criminal sanctions directed against the corporate entity.
As for the specific proposals for new criminal sanctions, there are in most cases persuasive arguments on both sides regarding their feasibilitv and effectiveness. For example, the fine which takes into account the size of the corporate offender, as well as the gradient of the harm caused by the violation, would seem to be a good general and specific deterrent. However, the possibility might exist that the modern corporation is able to absorb punishment such that the real burden falls upon shareholders, creditors, consumers and the community. Similarly, no amount of reform of indemnification statutes will achieve greater deterrent effect for individual criminal fines if corporations simply increase an executive's salary such that the individual is able to pay his or her own insurance premiums. In short, our knowledge of the relationship between the theories of criminal punishment and the nature of the modern corporation is not sufficiently developed to permit a committment to a particular sanction for a particular class of crimes. Instead, an effort should be made to authorize as wide a range of credible penalties as possible and to then examine their effectiveness. In this manner the sentencing judge will be able to adjust sentences for corporate crime both for the circumstances of each case, as well as for the observed effectiveness of the available sanctions.
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